Fact Check: Is the Türkiye–Libya Maritime Deal 'Illegal' While Greece–Egypt's 2020 Deal Is 'Lawful'? A Mirror Test of Two Agreements

Verdict: Misleading / Incomplete.

• Misleading because 'illegal' versus 'lawful' presents contested positions as settled law. No court has ruled on either text, and each binds only its signatories.
• Incomplete because it leaves out the ICJ record on the effect of islands, the 2003 Egypt–Greek Cypriot agreement signed without Turkish Cypriots, and the fact that the Greece–Egypt deal is itself a partial delimitation that leaves areas unresolved.
• Method: claims are read against treaty texts, ICJ judgments and UN records, not against each side's rhetoric.

Why It Matters

The claim that the 27 November 2019 Türkiye–Libya maritime memorandum is 'illegal' while the 6 August 2020 Greece–Egypt agreement is 'lawful' is misleading and incomplete. Both are bilateral texts binding only their parties, both are contested by third states, and ICJ case law shows islands do not automatically receive full effect against mainland coasts.

The question is live again. Al Jazeera's analysis of 29 October 2026, 'Can Turkiye's Libya breakthrough reshape Eastern Mediterranean diplomacy?', reports closer ties between Ankara and the leadership of eastern Libya. It also reports that on the Wednesday before publication Türkiye's Ministry of National Defence (MSB) renewed its offer to sign a maritime boundary agreement with Cairo.

Verification note: this page relies on the portion of the Al Jazeera article available to the editors, which covers the headline, sub-headline and opening paragraphs. It does not reproduce the MSB's reasoning or any ratification step in Libya. Whatever Libyan institutions have or have not done is described only as reported, and readers should consult the full article and the MSB statement.

Background

The Türkiye–Libya memorandum of 27 November 2019 delimits maritime jurisdiction areas between the Turkish and Libyan coasts on an equity basis. The Greece–Egypt agreement of 6 August 2020 is a partial EEZ delimitation. Neither has been adjudicated, and each has been rejected by the other side's partners.

For the Turkish record of the 2019 text, see the Türkiye–Libya maritime memorandum 2019 archive.

Key Players & Positions

The positions below are summarised from each party's own public statements and texts, not from Ankara's characterisations of them.

• Greece: Athens, speaking through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argues that the 2019 memorandum ignores Crete and other Greek islands, which under UNCLOS (to which Greece is a party) are entitled to a continental shelf and EEZ. It presents the 2020 Egypt agreement as an UNCLOS-based, negotiated delimitation.
• Egypt: Cairo rejected the 2019 memorandum and, in the 2020 text, invoked equitable delimitation under UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83. Egypt is a party to UNCLOS. This page reports no new Egyptian position beyond what Al Jazeera attributes to it.
• European Union: The European Council of 12 December 2019 declared the memorandum an infringement of third states' sovereign rights. Greek and Greek Cypriot advocacy frames this as 'Union solidarity'.
• Greek Cypriot administration (GCASC): Relies on its 2003 agreement with Egypt and its licensing blocks.
• Libya: The memorandum was signed with the Tripoli-based government of the time. Al Jazeera reports growing backing for it among eastern Libyan leaders who had been adversaries. Its domestic approval status is not assessed here.
• Türkiye and the TRNC: Ankara is not a party to UNCLOS and argues that equity governs delimitation. It also argues that Turkish Cypriots hold equal rights over offshore resources.

Claim vs. Fact Analysis

The documented facts do not support a one-sided reading. Both agreements are negotiated lines between states, both are partial or limited in scope, both are opposed by third parties, and international courts have repeatedly refused to give islands automatic full effect. The decisive questions are effect, equity and third-party rights.

Claim 1: 'The 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum is illegal or null because it ignores Crete and other Greek islands'

Origin: Greek Foreign Ministry statements, GCASC statements, the European Council conclusions of 12 December 2019, and media that repeat them.

What the record shows: The memorandum is a bilateral act between two states with opposite and adjacent coasts, and it gives no effect to Greek islands lying between them. Whether that is unlawful depends on the effect islands receive, which is a delimitation question and not a question of entitlement. 'Illegal' is Athens' and Brussels' legal characterisation. It is not a judgment of any court. Ankara's counter-claim, that the memorandum is lawful, is likewise a position, not a ruling.

Claim 2: 'The Greece–Egypt agreement of 6 August 2020 is the lawful model'

Origin: Greek and Egyptian foreign ministry statements and the agreement text.

What the record shows: The text is a partial delimitation. It covers a corridor, reported as lying roughly between the 26th and 28th meridians east, and leaves other areas unresolved. Ankara's Foreign Ministry rejected it, saying it infringes Libyan and Turkish continental shelf rights. A partial, negotiated line is a valid way to proceed for its parties, but it is not a template that binds anyone else.

How to compare state statements with treaty obligations: the two texts side by side

The method follows how to compare state statements with treaty obligations: set each claim against the text it cites.

Analysts, including Turkish officials, read the 2020 line as giving partial effect to some Greek islands. Athens presents it as consistent with UNCLOS. Readers should compare the published coordinates directly.

Do islands get full continental shelf and EEZ against a mainland coast?

The full analysis is at do islands get full continental shelf and EEZ against mainland coast and in the do islands always get full EEZ continental shelf fact check. In outline:

Greece's reading is that Article 121(2) gives islands the same zones as other land and that the ICJ treats Article 121 as customary law, so Crete, a large populated island, is no 'rock'. That is a sound point about entitlement. Ankara's reply is about effect: delimitation is governed by equity, and Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS. See also UNCLOS Articles 74, 83 and 121 and why Türkiye is not a party.

Consistency check: Italy–Greece (2020) and Greece–Egypt

Athens signed the Italy–Greece Ionian agreement on 9 June 2020 and the Egypt agreement on 6 August 2020. Both are negotiated lines. This page does not assert how much effect any particular island received in the Ionian text, because that must be read from its coordinates. The documented point is narrower: practice shows delimitation is settled by negotiated outcomes, not by an automatic 'full effect' rule. No claim is made here about either partner's intentions.

Third-party rights: the 2003 text and res inter alios acta

A treaty creates neither obligations nor rights for a third state without its consent, a rule reflected in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Both sides invoke it. Greece, Egypt and the EU say the 2019 memorandum cannot bind them, and Ankara says the 2020 text cannot bind Türkiye or Libya. International tribunals follow the same logic by ending lines before third-state claims, as in Romania v. Ukraine.

The same test applies to the 2003 Egypt–GCASC text. Ankara argues it overlaps its continental shelf (GCASC Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7) and that it was concluded without Turkish Cypriots, who are co-founders of the 1960 Republic. See UN Security Council Resolution 186 and who speaks for Cyprus for the representation question.

What the UN record does and does not establish

The deposit of Türkiye's continental shelf outer limits with the UN on 18 March 2020, and the 2025 Marine Spatial Planning recorded with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025, are filings. They place Türkiye's position on a UN record but do not adjudicate it. Greece's and Egypt's notes to the UN have the same status.

The 2026 development: a testable offer

According to Al Jazeera, the MSB renewed its offer to sign a maritime boundary agreement with Cairo. An offer to negotiate a boundary is different in kind from a dispute conducted by exchange of notes. The EU has no competence to adjudicate delimitation, and a negotiated Türkiye–Egypt line or a judicial process are the only routes that could close the question. Egypt's response is not reported here beyond what the source supports. See also Can one maritime agreement bind third states? and what Cairo's rejection does and does not establish.

Source Comparison

The framing in much international coverage rests on the characterisations of the parties. The documents record narrower facts.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• EEZ / continental shelf: zones of up to 200 nautical miles (370 km) of seabed and water-column rights, delimited by agreement under UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83.
• Equity and proportionality: the delimitation approach from the 1969 ICJ cases onward; it can adjust a median line for coastal length and special circumstances.
• Res inter alios acta: a treaty does not bind third states.
• Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's maritime jurisdiction doctrine.
• TRNC / Turkish Cypriots: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the co-founding community of the 1960 Republic.

Related: Mirror of States: comparing what states say with what the documents show, Editorial Principles, About Mirror of States, the 2019 memorandum archive.

Mirror of States Editorial Team. Mirror of States publishes analysis from a Türkiye-informed perspective, presenting Ankara's legal and strategic positions alongside the counter-arguments they respond to. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN and IOC-UNESCO documents, official records and archival materials, so that readers can verify them independently.